Since September 11, the united states along with its allies have waged a popular war against terrorism, more specifically against Islamic militancy. One of the chief guises of this war on terror has been the abolition of the roots of the militant revivalists movements in the Muslim world and in turn introducing democracy and freedom to the Muslim masses.
From the Mediterranean Sea to the Arabian Gulf there has been slight changes in the socio-political, socio-economical and socio-educational domains of these societies. Many of the reform projects established by the governments in the Middle East have failed to address the public’s concerns as a consequence of the multifaceted crisis facing the Islamic society. The various guises involved in these reform projects, whether it is Islamic reform, democratic reform or social reform has only benefited the visionaries of these reforms and the designated classes associated with the reform and has left out of the equation the average Arab individual.
In spite of the failure of these projects there has been a novice appeal to liberal democracy in the Arab world. This new perspective has discovered its supporters since it has equitably addressed the political, social, economical and educational areas of the Arab society without substituting or obliterating their Arab and Islamic heritage.
The dynamic rise of liberal democratic theorists has been prevalent across the Arab/Muslim world, primarily in Iraq, after the third gulf war. The eruption of the quiescent liberal democratic movements in Iraq has been due to the introduction of democracy and freedom to the Iraqi society and the failure of the dominating Shia/Sunni revivalist movements in administrating power impartially and in solving the societal and economical crisis of the Iraqi society.
This article will investigate the contemporary liberal democratic movement in Iraq in terms of the sudden resurgence and its appeal to the masses in response to the political, social, economical and religious crisis facing the Iraqi society.
The Resurgence of Liberal Democracy in Iraq
The resurgence of a novice ideology comprehensive in its nature and diverse in its application has established a sudden appeal to many Iraqi intellectuals. The recurrent wave of this new form of revivalism has been explicit after the failure of political Islam in Iraq. On a regional scale, the Arab and Muslim world has been plagued by a revolutionary ideology that has marginalized the roles of the intellectuals, academics and women in the political, social, economical, and educational areas of their societies.
This form of revivalism known to the West as Islamic Revivalism or Islamic Fundamentalism has only stagnated the development of society, moreover, it has failed to address the crises of contemporary society because of the lack of structural and functional units capable of mobilizing the concerns and interests of the people.
Currently in Iraq, the dominating ideologies in the political arena have been Shia/Sunni revivalism and secular Kurdish nationalism. The Shia revivalist movements,
includes Hizb Al Dawa (The Islamic call), Al Majlis Al A’ala lil Thawra Al Islamiyia (The Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), Hizbollah (The Party of God) and Jeish Al Mahdi (The Soldiers of Mahdi). These factions differ in their militant involvement and use of violence in attaining political domination; nevertheless they all share a universal aspiration of inculcating a Shia Islamic form of government where the Shari ‘a (Islamic Law) is the only form of law and legislation. The Sunni revivalist movements as Hayat Ulama Al Muslimeen (The Islamic Jurist Council), Al Qaeda fee bilad Al Rafidain (Al-Qaeda in the Land between the two rivers), Al Hizb Al Islami (The Islamic Party) and Hizb Al Tawafek Al Islami (The Islamic Accord Party) also differ in their political agendas, from an extremist and militant ideology to a moderate organizational set of beliefs, yet these movements function for the establishment of a Sunni Islamic government where again the only form of law is the Shari ‘a. Therefore, both these revivalist movements whether Sunni or Shia anticipate of inculcating an Islamic form of government despite Iraq’s diverse socio-cultural and socio-religious population.
The Sunni and Shia revivalist movements have failed to demonstrate any form of appraisal to Iraq’s socio-economical, socio-cultural and socio-religious foundation. The primary groundwork of these two groups has been their sectarian interest and in some cases their loyalty to certain countries that fund their networks across Iraq; and hence this leaves out of the equation the national interest of the Iraqi society. While only concentrating on political power and social mobilization, this myopic vision encompassed by both the Shia and Sunni revivalist groups has suppressed and marginalized Iraq’s heritage and cultural diversity whether it is Arab, Kurd or Turkomen, Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Mandean or Yazidis.
In view of the acute objective of these two revivalist movements, liberal democracy has located local supporters and admirers amongst Iraq’s diverse population. The quiescent role and participation of liberal democratic movements in the political arena has been due to the marginal availability of funding for their projects and activities in spite of their productive projects.
This sudden appeal to liberal democracy by the population owes to the capability of addressing the needs of the public through educational institutions that work for the masses, initially by creating a sense of national emancipation, then by securing this national liberty under a constitutional law and finally expanding this emancipative notion on all levels of life. Liberal democracy focuses on the individual regardless of ethnicity, religious background or native language, and for that reason it equitably unites all members of society on the notion of human liberty. This is an imperative assessment of society because it includes the entire population without excluding any culture and religion.
This novice resurgence and appeal has demonstrated its ability to govern the national interest of the Iraqi nation, and it has unveiled that it is a harbinger in assessing, resolving and modifying the concerns of the Iraqi people without altering, replacing and destroying Iraq’s rich Arab and Islamic heritage and identity.
Conclusion
Shia and Sunni revivalism are likely to discontinue of being a major temporal influence in Iraq, both internally and regionally. Internally, the political development of both these revivalists groups have led to a pervasive understanding of the sectarian militancy of Islam. And regionally, these two movements have proved their striking animosity and violent confrontation and on a regional global scale in political domination, social mobilization and regional interventions in internal polity.
Additionally, these two groups lack national appeal since their revivalist thinkers express sectarian interest on all scales veiling behind the notion of national unity. The demands of the average Iraqi citizens has been forced aside concentrating only on the usurping of the national wealth and in orchestrating acts of terror on civilians, and training and funding militia groups associated with these revivalist movements. It seems that the only ones benefiting from the Shia and Sunni revivalists groups are its originators.
Their future availability in Iraq’s political arena will decrease because of the escalating demand for liberal democracy amongst the masses. In this new principle, the Iraqi people have discovered their potentials and abilities as emancipated citizens and through the instillation of educational institutions in the socio-political, socio-economical, socio-cultural and socio-educational domains, the Iraqi society shall progress and develop their national unity without the need of substituting or obliterating their pristine identities.
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